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I. INTRODUCTION
The University of Miami Law Review’s 2014 Symposium, Leading
from Below, honored Judge Jack B. Weinstein for his extraordinary
career as a private practitioner, government lawyer, advisor to legislators
and executive officials, major legal scholar, and federal district judge for
over forty-seven years. It also offered the possibility of pausing for sev-
eral days to consider the significance of the federal district courts more
generally.
II. THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
Too little attention is paid to the work of the federal trial courts. In
the two months immediately preceding this Symposium, Robert J.
Shelby of the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah made it possi-
ble for gay couples in Utah to marry by striking down the state’s anti-
gay marriage law.1 Less than one month later, Judge Terrence C. Kern
* Professor of Law, Touro Law School. Professor Morris delivered the Introduction of the
Keynote at the University of Miami Law Review’s 2014 Symposium, Leading from Below. See
2014 Symposium, U. MIAMI L. REV., http://lawreview.law.miami.edu/2014-symposium/ (last
visited Nov. 15, 2014).
1. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013). See also Emiley Morgan &
Marjorie Cortez, Gay Couples Wed After Federal Judge Overturns Utah’s Same-Sex Marriage
Ban, DESERET NEWS (Dec. 26, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865592784/
Federal-judge-rules-Utahs-ban-on-same-sex-marriage-unconstitutional.html?pg=all. Earlier in the
same month, a different federal district judge in Utah struck down part of Utah’s anti-polygamy
law. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013). See also Jack Healy, Uncertainty in
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for the Northern District of Oklahoma struck down that state’s constitu-
tional amendment barring same-sex marriage.2 In December 2013,
Judge Richard L. Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia held unconstitutional the National Security Agency’s program
of collecting data on every American’s telephone records. Within a few
days, Judge William Pauley III of the Southern District of New York
held the same practice constitutional.3 At the same time, the New York
Review of Books published a blistering article written by a judge of the
Southern District of New York demanding an explanation for why there
had not been a single prosecution of any prominent figure in the 2008
financial crisis.4 If this was not enough, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit summarily tossed out the findings of the highly
regarded Southern District Judge Shira Scheindlin, who held that the
New York City Police Department’s program of stopping and frisking
without reasonable individualized suspicion was unconstitutional.5
Federal district courts perform functions central to the modern
state—“policy-making, and social control, and regime legitimation.”6 In
the United States, the federal courts are instruments of national power.
Ordinarily, they are centralizing agents: enforcing the supremacy of the
federal government, helping to achieve national uniformity of govern-
ment policies, and conferring legitimacy on government activities. Yet,
paradoxically, the federal district courts are also decentralized institu-
tions operating under and constituted in some measure by state and local
political leaders.
As the major intake point for cases in the federal judiciary, the fed-
eral district courts are also an important part of the American political
process. They provide a forum in which individuals may seek to advance
their goals of directing governmental actions and allocating resources.
Judicial decisions resolve disputes, enforce norms, and allocate social
2. Bishop v. United States, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla.), cert. denied sub nom. Smith
v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014). See also Erik Eckholm, Oklahoma’s Ban on Gay Marriage is
Unconstitutional, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at A15, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2014/01/15/us/federal-judge-rejects-oklahomas-gay-marriage-ban.html.
3. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 41 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Judge Has Record of Wrestling
with Thorny Issues, and the U.S. Government, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2013, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/us/politics/judge-has-never-let-presidents-off-easy-on-pornogra
phy-terrorism-or-surveillance.html?_r=0; Joel Stashenko, U.S. Judge Backs Collection of Phone
Data, 250 N.Y. L.J. 1, Dec. 30, 2013, at 1, 1.
4. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/
jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/?pagination=false&printpage=true.
5. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 2013).
6. HERBERT JACOB ET AL., COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3
(1996).
2015] JACK B. WEINSTEIN: JUDICIAL ENTREPRENEUR 395
values. They may not be able to command social change, but they are
able to speed it up or slow it down. They monitor the institutions of
government and attempt to insure equal treatment and governmental
“fair play” by keeping the agencies of government within their constitu-
tional and statutory limits. They also are a “safety valve . . . provid[ing]
a forum for outraged individuals or groups to vent their disapproval” of
the actions of local, state, and national governments and sometimes of
the private sector as well.7
Although it is rare for an individual district court judge to make law
affecting the entire nation, by far the greatest quantity of cases decided
in the federal court system begin and end in the district court.8 District
judges preside over state trials, hear cases involving political corruption,
are the first source of interpretation of federal statutes, and implement
Supreme Court decisions. District judges play an important role in keep-
ing the powers of the federal and state governments in balance and con-
tribute to the protection of constitutional rights by insuring that
American governments operate under the rule of law. The district courts
are regulators of the market place, facilitators of interstate commerce,
protectors of property, and enforcers of federal law.
Why, then, is the literature on the federal district courts produced
by legal scholars, political scientists, historians, and journalists so rela-
tively thin?
First, a disproportionate amount of writing on American courts is
devoted to the Supreme Court of the United States. Second, while most
of the nearly one thousand district judges in the United States each deal
with hundreds of cases every year,9 many cases are not of great signifi-
cance to the legal or the political system. Furthermore, a study of those
district court cases that are of great significance demands knowledge of
far more areas of law than the Supreme Court—which primarily deals
7. KENNETH M. DOLBEARE, TRIAL COURTS IN URBAN POLITICS 113 (1967); see also
HERBERT JACOB, DEBTORS IN COURT 16 (1969) (“The services offered by the courts are a
significant element of the output of the political system.”); LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 66 (1997) (discussing policy considerations in the judicial process and their
implications for society); CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 7
(1993) (“The judicial process, like other political and governing processes, involves human beings
in setting goals and establishing values for society.”); ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL
POLITICS IN FRANCE 7, 10–15 (1992) (noting that judges, through their decisions, “necessarily
make public policy”).
8. See Judicial Caseload Indicators, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/Federal
JudicialCaseloadStatistics/caseload-statistics-2013/judicial-caseload-indicators.aspx (last visited
Dec. 17, 2014).
9. See Paul Mark Sandler, The World of a U.S. Magistrate Judge: An Interview with Paul W.
Grimm, SHAPIRO SHER GUINOT & SANDLER (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.shapirosher.com/pages/
news/136/the-world-of-a-u.s.-magistrate-judge_an-interview (indicating that federal trial judges
can hear an “extraordinarily large number of misdemeanor criminal cases” alone each year).
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with constitutional cases, criminal cases, and federal statutory
interpretation.
Additionally, while the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals
may be studied through judicial opinions (or opinion drafts), much of
the work of the district courts is not captured by opinions but buried in
lengthy records. A great deal of the important work of district judges
lacks a paper trail.10 It involves the judge’s role in framing, managing
and settling cases, his ability to be dignified, fair and efficient in the
courtroom, as well as his talent for creating findings of fact that are
useful for the court of appeals and, hopefully, that are reversal-proof.
Yet, much has happened in the past three decades to ease the bur-
dens of observers of the district courts. Electronic legal databases permit
almost instant compilation of any judge’s complete list of published
opinions (as well as unpublished ones that are accessible online). The
computer also allows for easy access to newspaper articles discussing
trial court proceedings of particular interest to the public. Some circuits
even publish weekly compilations of stories from newspapers through-
out the circuit, usually including those published at the seats of their
district courts.
In addition, circuit and district court historical societies have in
recent years stimulated a large number of oral histories of judges, some
of which are available online.11 Ordinarily, the oral histories at least illu-
minate the judge’s career before appointment to the bench, the appoint-
ment process, the transition to the bench, and the nature of the job.12
Sometimes they do more. There is already one published volume based
on such oral histories comparing the experiences of various judges on
various subjects.13
Furthermore, the publication of a dozen biographies of district and
appellate judges—who were elevated from the district courts—over the
last thirty years has illuminated the context in which the district judge
works.14 In addition, there are now more than a dozen good substantive
histories of individual district courts, most of which were written in the
last thirty years.15
10. Denise M. Keele et al., An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus
Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 213, 214 (2009).
11. For example, see The Senior Judge Oral History Program, PHILA. CTS., http://www.
courts.phila.gov/sjhistory/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2014).
12. See id.
13. See generally WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, FEDERAL JUDGES REVEALED (2008).
14. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (2004); FRANK
R. KEMERER, WILLIAM WAYNE JUSTICE: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY (1991); WILLIAM NELSON, IN
PURSUIT OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE: EDWARD WEINFELD AS LAWYER AND JUDGE (2004); POLLY J.
PRICE, RICHARD S. ARNOLD: A LEGACY OF JUSTICE ON THE FEDERAL BENCH (2009).
15. For a fairly complete list, see JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL BENCH 7
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Yet, the fact that the literature on the federal district courts is so
skimpy makes it difficult to judge the quality or influence of a particular
judge. If they are remembered at all, it is within their own district or
because they “escaped” the district bench and went on to a notable
career on the court of appeals (such as Learned Hand or Richard Arnold)
or because of their association with one particularly notable trial (such
as Harold Medina’s trial of the top leaders of the American Communist
Party16). One or two may be known for a particular opinion, such as that
of Judge John Woolsey of the Southern District of New York when the
federal government attempted to prevent James Joyce’s Ulysses from
reaching our shores.17 Finally, there are a very small handful of judges
who, because of the extraordinary courage they demonstrated in litiga-
tion of enormous political importance, have become icons of judicial
independence. The examples that come most rapidly to this observer’s
mind are Frank M. Johnson, Jr., and John J. Sirica.18
This article is intended to look at the career of one very well-
regarded judge through spectacles that offer a different vantage point on
a judicial career. Those spectacles—the concept of judicial entrepre-
neurship—seem to be particularly apt when applied to Judge Jack B.
Weinstein.
III. JUDICIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Two political scientists, Wayne V. McIntosh and Cynthia L. Cates,
have coined the term “judicial entrepreneur” to apply to the impact of
particular judges. McIntosh and Cates apply the term to a judge who is
“alert to the opportunity for innovation, who is willing to invest the
resources and assume the risks necessary to offer and develop a genu-
inely unique legal concept, and who must strategically employ the writ-
n.25 (2011). In addition, law reviews publish an occasional issue with articles about individual
judges, and judges themselves publish articles in law reviews and journals dedicated to judicial
administration. Formal court ceremonies—retirements, presentations of portraits, and in
memoriam proceedings—continue to be published in Federal Rules Decisions.
16. Harold Medina, U.S. Judge, Dies at 102, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 1990), http://www.ny
times.com/1990/03/16/obituaries/harold-medina-us-judge-dies-at-102.html (describing the late
Medina as having “achieved lasting fame for his handling of the trial of 11 Communist leaders”).
It must be noted that, even if Medina is remembered for the Communist trial he presided over as a
district judge, he was later elevated to the court of appeals, where he served for more than three
decades.
17. U.S. v. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff’d, 72 F.2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934).
18. As one living in New York City, I cannot help but also single out Judge Edward Weinfeld
of the Southern District, who was legendary for his fairness and commitment to justice. See
NELSON, supra note 14.
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ten word to undertake change.”19 Whether the concept will prove useful
when applied to individual judges generally can be left for another occa-
sion. The concept does seem to be quite useful for Judge Weinstein.
According to McIntosh and Cates, the entrepreneurial judge does
not have to be the author of a very important idea or concept, but he
must become its chief salesman.20 Four examples of entrepreneurial
judges are considered in McIntosh and Cates’ book: Louis Brandeis’
impact on the concept of the right to privacy; Sandra Day O’Connor’s
work enhancing the use of the Commerce Clause as a source of states’
rights against the federal government; Hans Linde’s reinvigoration and
reanimation of the development of state constitutional law; and Jerome
Frank’s doctrinal approach to obscenity and to intangible property.21
Historically, judicial entrepreneurs have been few in number
because of the desire for steadiness and immutability in the law. The
insularity of the judiciary and the norm of collegiality on appellate
courts necessitates convincing several other judges and discourages writ-
ing alone.22
According to McIntosh and Cates, to be a judicial entrepreneur a
judge must be (1) “alert to the opportunity for innovation,” (2) willing to
assume professional risks, and (3) willing to become a salesperson for
ideas.23 There have been and continue to be very few “entrepreneurial
judges” because the task requires an important commitment of time and
a willingness to endure criticism, reversal, and possibly even profes-
sional marginalization.24 The entrepreneurial judge must always prepare
for failure, for the law resists innovation.25
If few judges at any level view their role as innovators, or makers
and movers, of the law, then trial judges are even less likely to view
themselves as such.26
IV. JACK B. WEINSTEIN27
In his forty-seven year career, which is not yet complete, Jack
Weinstein has been the recipient of a long list of honors. The fact that
19. WAYNE V. MCINTOSH & CYNTHIA L. CATES, JUDICIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE ROLE OF
THE JUDGE IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 12 (1997).
20. Id. at 10.
21. Id. at 23, 47, 67, 91.
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 12–13.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 13.
26. WILLIAM I. KITCHEN, FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES: AN ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL PERCEPTIONS
77 (1978).
27. I used some of the following biographical material in my introduction of Judge Weinstein
at the University of Miami Law Review Symposium.
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this Symposium honors him and seeks lessons from his career from the
past and for the future certainly suggests that he has had a very wide
impact. And the University of Miami Law Review has not been alone in
its decision to focus its Symposium on Jack Weinstein’s work. By the
middle of 2014, there will have been four conferences at law schools
focusing upon Judge Weinstein’s work, which will have yielded four
published symposia.28 There were also celebratory programs at the New
York City Bar and Touro Law School at the time of Judge Weinstein’s
ninetieth birthday.29
As one of a handful of judges to receive the Edward J. Devitt
Award30—the highest accolade that federal judges award annually to
one of their number—Weinstein has, for more than a half-century, been
a central figure in the law of evidence, civil procedure, and New York
practice. He has produced a practice code, major treatises, and
casebooks. He has written hundreds of articles not only in these areas,
but also dealing with mass torts, legal ethics, institutional litigation, and
sentencing. As a judge and scholar, Weinstein has greatly influenced
developments in many fields of law, but perhaps nowhere more than in
the area of mass torts, where his management of the most complex cases
has been extraordinarily influential. He has been one of the nation’s
most innovative judges during the past half-century, introducing count-
less improvements into New York State and federal law.31
Born in 1921 into a warm Jewish family living temporarily in
Wichita, Kansas, Jack Weinstein grew up in Brooklyn.32 After graduat-
ing from Brooklyn College, he served during the Second World War as
a junior officer on a submarine in the Pacific.33 After the war, Weinstein,
who previously had never even met an attorney, entered Columbia Law
28. See Stephen Breyer, Tribute to the Honorable Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1947
(1997); Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Tort Litigation, and the Public Good: A Roundtable Discussion
to Honor One of America’s Greatest Trial Judges on the Occasion of His 80th Birthday, 12 J.L. &
POL’Y 149 (2003) [hereinafter 80th Birthday Roundtable]. In 2014, symposia were held at both
the University of Miami School of Law and DePaul Law School.
29. See The Jurisprudence of Jack Weinstein, N.Y.C. BAR, http://www2.nycbar.org/Events
Calendar/show_event_new.php?eventid=1719 (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
30. See also Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 160 F.R.D.
287, 355 (1994) (comments of Judge Gasch) (presenting Judge Jack Weinstein with the Edward J.
Devitt award).
31. John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation: Weinstein on
Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2035 (1997) (“As a lawyer, scholar, and jurist, Judge Weinstein
has introduced countless improvements, small and large, into nearly every aspect of New York
and federal law.”).
32. See The Lawrence A. Wien Prize for Social Responsibility 2011 Honoree: Hon. Jack B.
Weinstein ’48, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/
2011/november2011/2011-wien-prize-bio-weinstein (last visited Dec. 17, 2014).
33. WWII Profile: Jack B. Weinstein, U.S. CTS. (Jun. 16, 2014), http://news.uscourts.gov/
wwii-profile-jack-b-weinstein.
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School where he made a distinguished record.34 In the first few years
after his graduation, Weinstein practiced law, served as a law clerk to
New York Court of Appeals Judge Stanley H. Fuld—then one of the
outstanding state jurists in the nation—and worked for a Republican
State Senator, Seymour Halpern.35
In 1952, Weinstein became Columbia Law School’s first faculty
hire after the war.36 He would continue to teach a full load at Columbia
for decades after his appointment to the bench. Early in his teaching
career, Weinstein was a member of the legendary team of attorneys who
worked on the NAACP Supreme Court brief in Brown v. Board of
Education.37
As special counsel to the New York Joint Committee on Motor
Vehicle Problems, Weinstein drafted the revision of the New York State
Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law. Then, he served as consultant to and
reporter for the New York Temporary Commission on the Courts
(“Tweed Commission”), which was the driving force behind what still
remains the last significant revision of the Judiciary article of the New
York State Constitution.38 Then, he was the primary draftsman of the
completely revised New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”),
which still remains in effect.39 “While working on the CPLR, Weinstein
gathered materials for what became an eight-volume treatise on New
York civil procedure, which he edited with [Harold] Korn and [Arthur]
Miller.”40
Weinstein was appointed by Chief Justice Earl Warren to the Advi-
sory Committee to the Judicial Conference Committee on Evidence in
1966.41 As a professor and then as a judge, “Weinstein took an active
role in the creation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”42 “After the Rules
were promulgated, Weinstein repeated what he had done with the CPLR,
sharing authorship of a treatise and manual on evidence with Margaret
Berger, a former law clerk and a professor of law at Brooklyn Law
School.”43 Weinstein was thus able to influence the interpretation by
34. Id.
35. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 44–45.
36. Id. at 45.
37. Id.; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 48.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE (1963). The
three men also produced JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., MANUAL: NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE LAW
AND RULES (1967). Weinstein also produced a casebook on civil procedure with his Columbia
colleague, Maurice Rosenberg. See MAURICE ROSENBERG ET AL., ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(1976).
41. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 49.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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attorneys and judges of New York civil practice and of the federal evi-
dence rules in their formative years, while at the same time creating
important reference works that are very much in use today.44
In the fifteen years before his appointment to the federal bench,
Weinstein used his professional expertise to assist a number of men
engaged in political life including State Senator Seymour Halpern, Nas-
sau County Executive Eugene Nickerson (for whom Weinstein served as
County Attorney), and Senator Robert F. Kennedy.45 At one point, Ken-
nedy had intended that Weinstein run for State Attorney General.46
Later, Kennedy offered to appoint Weinstein judge of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York.47 But Weinstein, heavily
involved in work as advisor to the State Constitutional Convention,
turned him down.48 However, when, several months later, Kennedy
offered to appoint him judge of the Eastern District of New York, Wein-
stein, fed up with the Convention, accepted with alacrity.49 Confirmation
was no problem.50
When Weinstein took the oath as federal judge in May 1967, he
was by ability and background well-qualified for the bench.51 Although
his experience in private practice had been limited, Weinstein had law-
yering experience from his work as a government lawyer and from the
handling of pro bono cases.52 As a full professor at one of the nation’s
leading law schools, Weinstein had taught not only civil procedure and
evidence—two subjects essential for a federal judge—but had also
either taught or written in a wide variety of fields, including conflict of
laws, searches and seizures, pretrial discovery, and reapportionment.53
Ironically, Weinstein probably knew more about New York practice
than anyone else alive, but this would be of relatively minor assistance
to him as a federal judge.54
Weinstein brought to the bench “an outstanding legal mind, intel-
lectual curiosity, [inhuman] energy, decisiveness, . . . [striking] indepen-
44. See generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE (1975). See also JACK
B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL STUDENT EDITION (7th
ed. 2005); JOHN M. MAGUIRE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (6th ed. 1973). He also
revised EDWARD R. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE (Jack B.
Weinstein ed., 5th ed. 1976).
45. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 50–54, 68.





51. Id. at 69.
52. Id. at 70.
53. Id. at 70.
54. Id.
402 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:393
dence, and felicity of literary style.55 His work would be unusually
thorough.56 As a judge, he became a master of the craft of opinion writ-
ing and would be unusually productive in dealing with his docket.57 He
proved innovative in the use of new technology in the courtroom,
remarkably flexible in employing procedural rules, and strikingly crea-
tive with substantive law.58 He also demonstrated a “capacity to gain
attention for his ideas, decisions, and [other] activities.”59
Weinstein’s judicial career began in 1967.60 Perhaps the most
important case of Weinstein’s first decade on the bench involved the
desegregation of a junior high school on Coney Island.61 In that case,
Weinstein, who appointed a special master to assist him, flirted with
issuing an order attacking the totality of the problem of desegregation on
Coney Island—involving remedies dealing with education, housing,
police, parks, and transportation—but ultimately ended up with a mod-
est resolution: the creation of a magnet school.62 In the long run, this
remedy proved quite successful. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed, but not without some sharp criticism.63
Not the least of Judge Weinstein’s activities during his first decade
on the bench was his electoral candidacy for the Democratic nomination
for Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals in 1973.64 He was
the first federal judge to run for that office since Learned Hand
attempted it sixty years before. Weinstein was barely defeated.65
During Weinstein’s second decade on the bench (1977–87), his
First Amendment decisions “marked him as a votary of free speech.”66
“His criminal docket yielded prominent mob defendants and several
[important] prosecutions for political corruption.”67 Once again, there
55. Id. at 72.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 91.
58. Id. at 89.
59. Id.
60. Judge Jack B. Weinstein, U.S. DIST. CT. E. DIST. N.Y., https://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/
content/judge-jack-b-weinstein (last visited Dec. 17, 2014).
61. Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699, 756 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 487 F.2d
223 (2d Cir. 1974).
62. Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). See also MORRIS,
supra note 15, at 150–51.
63. Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 512 F.2d 37, 41, 56 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[The community school
board] succeeded initially in getting the District Judge to convert a narrow issue involving a single
junior high school with a capacity of about 1,000 students into what could only become an issue
so broad as to defy judicial competence, a matter which would require . . . action by three
governments, federal, state and city, for a solution.”).
64. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 155–60.
65. Id. at 155.
66. Id. at 161.
67. Id.
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were important cases affecting the New York City public schools. His
most important litigation by far in these years was the Agent Orange
class action discussed later in this article.68
During this period, Weinstein, bypassed for appointment to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, served as Chief Judge of
the Eastern District from 1980 to 1988.69 He employed that position to
assist poor litigants, help prevent a split of the Eastern District, and was
a gadfly, opposing changes in judicial administration proposed by Chief
Justice Warren Burger and Second Circuit Chief Judge Irving R.
Kaufman.70
Probably the most notable case of Weinstein’s third decade on the
bench (1987–97) involved the controversy over the Shoreham Nuclear
Reactor on Long Island. Presiding over what had become a bitter public
dispute over the safety of a nuclear reactor, Weinstein was able to settle
the case (and close the reactor) with the assistance of Kenneth Feinberg
as mediator and the cooperation of New York State Governor Mario
Cuomo.71 During this period, Weinstein also handled a number of high-
profile criminal cases including those involving the Gambino and
Colombo crime families and the Colombian drug cartel.72
From the early 1990s to the present, Weinstein has been an ener-
getic and visible critic of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Though far
from alone, he “marshaled his craft, reputation, energy, and stubborn-
ness” in an attempt to thwart a system he passionately believed was
“lacking in humanity.”73
During his fourth decade on the bench (1997–2007), Weinstein
handled several important mass tort cases also discussed later in this
article. Perhaps the most remarkable of the rest of his judicial efforts
during this period was his involvement in clearing the backlog of habeas
corpus petitions from the dockets of most of his colleagues.74 While
continuing to handle his own docket, Weinstein volunteered at the age of
eighty-two to dispose of five hundred petitions.75 He did it, he
explained, because he thought it “unfair to make prisoners wait for
years.”76 Disposing of the cases in about nine months, Weinstein granted
the petition in nine cases, dismissed it in four hundred and forty-one,
68. See infra Part III.B. See also MORRIS, supra note 15, at 87.
69. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 87, 161.
70. Id. at 204–05.
71. See, e.g., Cnty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1428 (1989).
72. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 212.
73. See id. at 243, 244–79.
74. Id. at 281.
75. Id.
76. See William Glaberson, Unbelievable Stories (Just Ask the Judge); A Last Hearing for
495 Lost Causes, Each One ‘a Movie of the Week’, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2003, at B1, available at
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closed forty-four administratively, reassigned three, and consolidated
three with earlier petitions.77
Perhaps the most important case of this period that did not involve
a mass tort or a petition for habeas involved New York City’s Adminis-
tration for Children’s Services’ policy of automatically taking children
away from mothers battered by their husbands and boyfriends immedi-
ately after notice of the battering.78 In Nicholson v. Williams,79 Wein-
stein “made use of experts from all over the country, . . . insisted that
persons involved [with the] administration of the policy come to court,
and . . . [wrote an] extensive opinion laying out the problems.”80 As a
result of the litigation, the City completely reorganized the way it han-
dled such matters.81
With his fifth decade on the bench more than half over, the 93-
year-old judge continues to carry a full load of cases, to consistently
write opinions more than one hundred pages long, and to make the front
pages of The New York Law Journal and The New York Times. He con-
tinues to be absorbed by the cases before him with a particular concern
for class actions and otherwise aggregated cases, as well as cases in
which mandatory minimum sentences are required. In one child pornog-
raphy case in which the jury brought in a guilty verdict, Weinstein held
that because he had not informed the jury of the five-year minimum
sentence required on conviction for receiving child pornography, he had
committed a constitutional error.82 The court of appeals vacated Wein-
stein’s reversal of himself and remanded, but the battle had only just
been joined.83 That case produced a front-page story in The New York
Times.84 After reversal in another case in which the defendant was ini-
tially sentenced to thirty months (half the mandatory minimum) plus
five years of supervised release for the crime of distributing child por-
nography, Weinstein replied with a memorandum and order the very
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/30/nyregion/unbelievable-stories-just-ask-judge-last-hearing-
for-495-lost-causes-each-one.html.
77. See In re Habeas Corpus Cases, 216 F.R.D. 45 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Habeas Corpus
Cases, 298 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
78. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 281–82.
79. 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
80. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 299.
81. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. at 257. See also Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y.
2004), aff’d, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003); Nicholson v. Williams, No. 00-cv-5155, 2004 WL
1304055 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004), modifying 181 F. Supp. 2d 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
82. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 279.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d,
United States v. Polouizzi [sic], 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009). See also A.G. Sulzberger, Defiant
Judge Takes on Child Pornography Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010, at A1.
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same day that he was reversed by the Second Circuit.85
While Jack Weinstein’s brilliance is virtually universally acknowl-
edged, he has been criticized for departing from the detachment required
of a judge, for making too much law, and for employing too many inno-
vations.86 If that be so, it should be understood that Weinstein is no
knee-jerk activist. The breadth of his knowledge, the eloquence of his
prose, the thoroughness of his work, and his capacity to shape—and
sometimes transform—cases by putting ingenious strategies into the
minds of the attorneys before him sets him apart from other judges.
Thurgood Marshall, not known for flowery tributes, wrote to Weinstein,
“You have, more than anyone I know of, contributed your share to the
work of the federal judiciary.”87 Professor Alan Dershowitz called
Weinstein, “the most important Federal judge in the last quarter
century.”88
A. Weinstein the Judicial Entrepreneur
Two major characteristics of Judge Weinstein push him in the
entrepreneurial direction. First, he has never been just a judge. For most
of his time on the bench, he has also been a full-time professor.89 He is,
by nature, an inveterate and incorrigible educator. Throughout his
career, he has had something to say to a number of different audiences—
fellow judges at all levels, law professors, U.S. prosecutors, defense
attorneys, the class action bar, public interest lawyers, and, of course,
law students. In his oral history, Weinstein commented, “I’ve never
ignored an opportunity of a public forum to make a little substantive
statement.”90 The treatise, the casebooks, the books on rule-making and
mass torts, the super-abundant number of law review articles, the hun-
dreds of speeches (many going through a number of drafts), law school
teaching, and, of course, the opinions themselves bear witness to some-
one who simply must educate, teach, illuminate, and advocate.
One of Weinstein’s most illustrative educational efforts has been
the treatise-like opinions he issues that illuminate areas of law for his
85. United States v. C.R., 296 F.R.D. 131, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
86. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 2.
87. Joseph Goldstein, New View of Brown v. Board Unlikely to Sway One Judge, N.Y. SUN
(July 9, 2007), http://www.nysun.com/new-york/new-view-of-brown-v-board-unlikely-to-sway-
one/58071.
88. William Glaberson, A Judge Shows Who’s Boss, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1997, at 21.
89. Professor Stephen B. Burbank has argued that Judge Weinstein’s conception of the
judicial role has been greatly influenced by his career as a law professor, pointing to Weinstein’s
desire for intellectual autonomy and lack of desire for intellectual accountability. Stephen B.
Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and Ideology in the Work of
Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971 (1997).
90. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 108.
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fellow-judges, magistrate judges, and practitioners. Among the examples
are opinions on calculating damages for pain and suffering,91 admitting
government reports on police misconduct in civil rights cases,92 admit-
ting evidence on radioimmunoassay of hair analysis,93 and recom-
mending procedures to employ in dealing with habeas corpus
petitions.94
Second, Weinstein’s judicial career has been marked by innovation
in methods of managing cases, techniques employed in the courtroom,
application of procedural rules, and development of the substantive
law.95 He has made heavy use of magistrates and special masters, auda-
cious use of equity powers, and flexible use of procedure.96 He has made
considerable use of advisory juries,97 tried civil rights actions by prison-
ers in jails,98 employed the use of restitution as part of a criminal sen-
tence,99 videotaped sentencing hearings to permit court of appeals
judges to actually see the prisoner and his family,100 and was one of the
first American judges to employ international human rights norms in
deportation cases.101
Weinstein, thus, has all of the qualifications for judicial entrepre-
neurship mentioned by McIntosh and Cates save one—sitting on an
appellate court.102 Throughout his career he has been alert to the oppor-
tunity for innovation. His grand vision of the law came from his teach-
ing and scholarship. His self-confidence and willingness to take risks,
including reversal, seem to have been generated by his personality. Cer-
tainly, since the beginning of his judicial career, he has been fiercely
independent. When describing how he felt at the beginning of his career,
Weinstein said: “I was the Article III judge. . . . An independent branch
of the government. . . . I didn’t care what anybody else was doing or
what the Court of Appeals was doing. I’d listen to them, but I had an
91. Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640, 662–64 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
92. King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 186–98 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
93. United States v. Medina, 749 F. Supp. 59, 60–62 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
94. In re Habeas Corpus Cases, 298 F. Supp. 2d 303, 313–17 (reporting on 500 habeas cases
and proposing procedures for the handling of future habeas cases).
95. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 105.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 106; see also Jack B. Weinstein & Jeffrey B. Morris, Oral History of Jack B.
Weinstein 442 (1993- ) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Weinstein Oral
History].
98. Id. (manuscript at 12–13).
99. See Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of
Administrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 961–62 (2001) [hereinafter
Compensation for Mass Private Delicts].
100. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 277 (citing In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)).
101. Id. at 302.
102. MCINTOSH & CATES, supra note 19, at 9–12.
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enormous sense of independence.”103
Throughout his career, Weinstein has demonstrated his indepen-
dence in a number of ways. He refuses to wear robes during sentenc-
ing.104 He handles motions around a table.105 He has publicly criticized
proposals put forward by “judicial superiors,” such as Chief Justice
Warren Burger and Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit Irving Kaufman, that imposed new standards on trial and appel-
late advocates.106 Aware of the risks to judges of granting bail to unpop-
ular defendants, he has continued to do so even though the court of
appeals reverses.107 Weinstein presided over a celebrated trial of “two
corrupt New York City policemen who had been on the payroll of the
Mafia”—even committing murder.108 After he sentenced each to life
imprisonment, Weinstein overturned their convictions on statute of limi-
tations grounds.109 “He explained that if he had not acted on the statute
of limitations problem”110 and the appeal had just been of the convic-
tion, the court of appeals
would just affirm. They wouldn’t take the heat. But if I take the heat I
think it’s more likely they will affirm my dismissal because then they
can blame me. But I think that is appropriate. I don’t care. If you’re
going to claim the Rule of Law then we have the Rule of Law.111
Thus, criticism or skepticism of his work from other judges or from
attorneys does not deter Weinstein.
With a rapid and eloquent pen, more accessibility to the press than
most judges, and a willingness to give speeches, Weinstein has through-
out his judicial career had the ability to attract attention beyond his dis-
trict for his ideas, decisions, and activities, thus ultimately developing
what may fairly be called a national constituency.112
Three factors might have limited Weinstein’s “career” as a judicial
entrepreneur. First were the pressures of his docket. The life of a district
judge is hurried and the flow of cases is unending. Much of what a
district judge does is manage cases, sentence defendants, author findings
103. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 97 (manuscript at 20).
104. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 101.
105. Id.





111. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 97 (manuscript at 1839). On Weinstein’s
independence, see MORRIS, supra note 15, at 102. Incidentally, the court of appeals did not affirm
his dismissal of the case. United States v. Eppolito, 436 F. Supp. 2d 532, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2006),
rev’d, 543 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2008). The two convicted defendants remain in jail.
112. See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 108.
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of fact, and preside over trials. Ordinarily, that leaves little time for deep
thought or the writing of anything other than opinions. Weinstein over-
came this factor because of his quick and absorptive mind, ability to
sustain extraordinarily hard work, and the fact that he requires less sleep
than most human beings.113
The second possible factor is the problem district judges have of
not hearing enough cases in their area of potential entrepreneurship to
develop a case line. Further, district judges ordinarily have no preceden-
tial authority over any other Article III court. The Supreme Court Justice
writes for the nation. The court of appeals judge ordinarily has authority
over district courts in their region (the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is a special case). The district judge has authority only in his own
courtroom. However, the class actions before Weinstein made it possible
to develop a line of cases that gave national visibility to his work.114
One last factor which might have made entrepreneurial activity
unlikely for Weinstein in particular was that he has never limited him-
self to “selling” a single idea. With his strong sense of where the law
should be headed and his engagement with many ideas and innovations,
it might not have been possible for him to focus enough of an effort in a
single area of law to effectively sell his views to a variety of audiences.
The development of Weinstein’s interest in class actions would give him
the necessary focus.
B. Jack Weinstein and Class Actions
Judge Weinstein has been a prominent booster—a judicial entrepre-
neur even—of using class actions to deal with mass torts. Weinstein
strongly believes that class actions generally make it feasible to bring
justice to the individual in a flexible, efficient, and politically sensitive
way.115 His Agent Orange litigation116 spurred the use of class actions
for mass torts. In the thirty years since that litigation settled, Weinstein
has been heavily involved in other mass tort class actions. He has writ-
ten dozens of published opinions and law review articles, as well as a
book on a range of problems from the definition of classes and sub-
classes to matters such as jurisdiction, attorneys’ fees, choice of law,
excessive jury awards, lawyers’ ethics, and how to improve scientific
testimony.117
113. Id. at 55.
114. See infra Part III.A.
115. Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the “Abusiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D.
299 (1973).
116. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
117. Burbank, supra note 89, at 1983.
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Professor Linda Mullenix of the University of Texas School of
Law, a respectful yet stern critic of Weinstein, has stated that that there
has probably been “no judge more identified with the aggregate litiga-
tion movement of the late twentieth century” than Weinstein.118 Wein-
stein, she says, has earned the title “King of Mass Torts” and has, in
turn, spawned generations of acolytes throughout the legal commu-
nity.119 Yet, in spite of his support for the aggregation of mass tort cases,
Weinstein has repeatedly emphasized the importance of individual
justice.120
One reason Weinstein has been so effective in the realm of mass
tort class actions is his ability to find connections between apparently
dissimilar legal issues when dealing with multi-level legal problems.
Weinstein sees opportunities in the cases that come before him that
others do not see and has the capacity to devise novel remedies.121
Weinstein’s earliest experience with class actions occurred during
his practice shortly after law school graduation.122 When he was
exposed to shareholders’ derivative suits, he saw that the class action
was proving useful in treating the rights of a great many dispersed small
claims holders.123 He came to realize that “a lot of poor people” that he
was dealing with “were not going to get any place . . . unless they were
able to assemble their forces through class actions.”124
Only months before Weinstein began his judicial career in 1967,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to get around the
inflexibility of their joinder provisions.125 A year later, Congress enacted
legislation dealing with multidistrict litigation that “liberally provided
for the transfer of cases within the federal system to [a single] venue for
coordinated pre-trial proceedings.”126 These changes “made possible
modern federal complex litigation.”127
Contemporaneously, in Dolgow v. Anderson,128 Weinstein took the
position that class actions were important. Several years later in his first
118. Linda S. Mullenix, Competing Values: Preserving Litigant Autonomy in an Age of
Collective Redress, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2426829.
119. Id. at 2.
120. Id. at 19.
121. See generally Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of
Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010 (1997).
122. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 127.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 74.
126. Mullenix, supra note 118, at 7.
127. Id. at 5–7.
128. 43 F.R.D. 472, 482 (1968), rev’d, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
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mass tort case, he dealt with litigation growing out of eighteen separate
accidents in which children were killed or maimed by blasting caps.129
The effect of the explosion made it impossible to determine which cor-
poration had manufactured a particular blasting cap.130 Since the
national pattern of production and distribution of the blasting caps was
known and the companies were bound together by their decision to
oppose legislation requiring markings to warn of the danger, Weinstein
held all the wrongdoers jointly liable for creating an unreasonable risk of
harm.131 Reflecting on the blasting cap cases, Weinstein said that he had
been thinking about the problem of dealing with indeterminate defend-
ants in defective product liability cases for some time, and the blasting
cap cases were the catalyst to reach “fairly firm conclusions about it.”132
The new theory Weinstein used for expanding defective product liability
in indeterminate defendant cases to cover an entire industry would exer-
cise a strong influence on the way the high courts of California and New
York would deal with the problem.133
During the 1970s, Weinstein gained experience in class actions by
dealing with securities and labor matters, as well as in cases involving
schools and prisons.134 However, the first time a class action was used in
a mass tort case occurred in the Eastern District of Kentucky, where a
fire in a supper club killed 159 people and injured another one hun-
dred.135 But the litigation which crystallized attention in the legal world
on the potential of the class action for mass torts was the Agent Orange
litigation over which Weinstein presided.136
The Agent Orange litigation was based upon the damage that may
have been caused by the toxic substance dioxin contained in the herbi-
cide Agent Orange, which the U.S. armed forces used in Vietnam to
defoliate jungles and mangroves.137 Between 600,000 and 2.4 million
veterans were believed to have had some exposure to the herbicide.138
During the 1970s, veterans and their families began to attribute a variety
129. See Chance v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439, 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1974);
Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
130. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 358.
131. Id. at 365–66.
132. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 97 (manuscript at 256).
133. See Weinstein Oral History, supra note 97 (manuscript at 146); see also Robert L. Rabin,
Judge Weinstein and the World of Tort: Institutional and Historical Perspectives, 64 DEPAUL L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 6–9).
134. Mullenix, supra note 118, at 8 n.41.
135. See Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 44 (E.D. Ky. 1977).
136. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 818
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). See also PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 111–42 (1986).
137. In re “Agent Orange,” 597 F. Supp. at 775–77.
138. Id. at 756.
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of illnesses and reproductive problems to exposure to the herbicide.139
As a result of multidistrict procedures, the Agent Orange litigation
became the largest mass tort case up to that time. Already, six hundred
lawsuits had been filed by 15,000 individuals.140 However, the Agent
Orange litigation was not a typical mass accident case in which many
persons are simultaneously harmed in the same way by the same cause.
In Agent Orange, there had been multiple occurrences of various related
harms over a considerable amount of time and space. The plaintiff’s
class was indeterminate because, in the future, other individuals might
become aware that they suffered from conditions that could be attributed
to Agent Orange. Weinstein, however, was not only confronted with the
dilemma of an indeterminate plaintiff class. The defendants, too, were
indeterminate because the armed forces had mixed together the defoli-
ants produced by different companies before they were used.141
The Agent Orange cases were consolidated for pretrial purposes to
an able colleague of Weinstein, Judge George Pratt.142 Eventually the
case was reassigned to Weinstein as a result of Pratt’s elevation to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.143 Weinstein rapidly mastered
the essentials of the case, developing a view of the litigation as being not
just a product liability case multiplied many times over, but also a major
social problem needing settlement.144 He aimed for a solution whereby
the veterans would “not be left without a sense of recourse,” but the
defendants would be charged only for the harm they had caused.145
Some scholars argue that this made the litigation more a problem of
politics than of law.146
Judge Weinstein took a comprehensive role in managing and struc-
turing the Agent Orange litigation. He certified the case as a class action,
making possible a classwide determination of the total harm to the entire
body of plaintiffs.147 He also saw that, under the enterprise liability the-
ory he had set forth in the blasting cap cases,148 each corporation could
be held liable for a pro rata share of the plaintiffs’ injuries.
Weinstein helped settle the Agent Orange litigation by emphasizing
139. Id. at 766–67.
140. Id. at 749–50.
141. Id. at 748.
142. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 325.
143. Id. at 326.
144. Id.
145. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469,
550 (1994) [hereinafter Ethical Dilemmas].
146. David Luban, Heroic Judging in an Antiheroic Age, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2064, 2085
(1997).
147. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
148. See supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text.
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to each set of attorneys the weaknesses and risks in their own cases and
by appointing a magistrate, Shira Scheindlin (now an Article III judge),
to telescope three years of discovery into three months.149 Each side,
therefore, was facing an imminent trial that neither was ready for. Wein-
stein was unable to get around the fact that the United States government
was immune from suit, but he kept the government formally in the case,
hoping that it would realize its moral liability and contribute to devising
a more comprehensive political solution than could be achieved through
litigation.150
Weinstein made one major step towards resolving the case by
determining the appropriate law to apply. Though he was apparently
bound by the court of appeals’ reversal of then-District Judge Pratt’s
decision to apply one single law—federal common law—to the case,151
Weinstein hit upon an ingenious solution. He chose to apply what he
called a “national consensus” standard as the appropriate governing
law.152 Weinstein did everything he could to avoid that issue coming
before the court of appeals before the case settled. He denied certifica-
tion of the interlocutory appeal from his order certifying a class action
and avoided writing formal opinions, instead giving many un-appealable
signals from the bench through “‘tentative’ rulings,” which revealed his
preliminary thinking to lawyers.153 Essentially, he was working within
the interstices of the final judgment rule.154
Weinstein appointed three special masters to iron out the details of
the settlement, of which the principal terms “seem to have been quite
literally dictated by Weinstein” himself.155 Weinstein insisted on $180
million dollars, which was $20 million less than what the attorneys for
both sides would have actually agreed upon.156 After the settlement,
Weinstein held fairness hearings for six days and nights.157 During these
hearings, he heard the tragic stories of hundreds of victims.158 At the end
of that process, he issued his “fairness” opinion upholding the
149. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 327–28.
150. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1221, 1222 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
151. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1980) (distinguishing
Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979)).
152. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 330.
153. Minow, supra note 121, at 2030.
154. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). See also
SCHUCK, supra note 136, at 118, 130–31; Burbank, supra note 89, at 1988–89; Burt Neuborne,
Innovation in the Interstices of the Final Judgment Rule: A Demurrer to Professor Burbank, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2091, 2092 (1997).
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settlement.159
Weinstein, in Agent Orange, laid out a series of rulings and opin-
ions which would prove enormously influential throughout the nation
when judges were dealing with aggregated cases in such areas as class
certification, choice of law, attorneys’ fees, and the appointment of spe-
cial masters.
After a prolonged delay, a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed
most of Weinstein’s appealable rulings in Agent Orange, but he was
partially reversed on lawyers’ fees.160 Additionally, while he had not
intended to oversee the work of the foundation created to distribute the
70 million dollars in the settlement that had been awarded to assist
members of the veterans’ families, the court of appeals told him to do
so.161
Ultimately, the United States government did aid the veterans. In
1991, Congress passed legislation providing payments for diseases “pre-
sumptively” caused by Agent Orange.162 Weinstein put the class action
in this perspective:
We got out a little money in order to permit the government ulti-
mately to step in and do what the government had to do that was
right . . . . [T]he court order was just a stop gap to permit something
good to happen on the political field.163
If Agent Orange was “[p]erhaps the most emblematic, seminal
mass tort litigation”164 of the 1980s, it was not alone. There was, for
example, litigation over the Dalkon Shield in the Northern District of
California and the Eastern District of Virginia, and litigation involving
Bendectin in the Southern District of Ohio. A number of judges began to
believe that, in the face legislative inaction, the centralization of deci-
sions and aggregation of claims were preferred methods of case manage-
ment in mass tort cases. If handled individually, they thought, the sheer
volume of cases would deny individuals their day in court.165
Such support would last into the 1990s, but then concerns arose as
commentators began questioning whether the rationales supporting class
certification subverted rights of litigant autonomy, which was generally
159. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 857–58 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). See
MORRIS, supra note 15, at 332–33. But see Luban, supra note 146, at 2081 (criticizing the Agent
Orange opinion).
160. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987); In re “Agent
Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 226 (2d Cir. 1987).
161. In re “Agent Orange,” 818 F.2d at 186; MORRIS, supra note 15, at 335.
162. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 336.
163. 80th Birthday Roundtable, supra note 28, at 225.
164. Mullenix, supra note 118, at 10.
165. But see id. at 11.
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described as the right to manage one’s litigation, to have the opportunity
to develop the litigation, and to appear and give testimony before a
jury.166 Rising doubts began to appear in appellate decisions. One of the
particular concerns involved the enormous transaction costs of such
class actions.167
In the meantime, Judge Weinstein was dealing with other mass tort
litigations. While he would make other important contributions, never
again would he achieve a global resolution. Perhaps the most significant
defeat occurred in the area of asbestos litigation where tens of thousands
of new cases every year were plaguing the federal courts,168 and the
Multidistrict Litigation Panel was continuing to reject consolidation.169
In 1990, Weinstein joined with ten other judges in an ill-fated attempt to
forge a grand resolution of all asbestos claims throughout the nation.170
The effort failed, although it may well have stimulated the Multidistrict
Litigation Panel to assign all the cases to Judge Charles Weiner of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, who closed out 78,000 lawsuits, but
also could never achieve a global resolution.171
Weinstein’s major contribution to the asbestos problem was to
order a complete overhaul of the Johns Manville Trust (“Trust”) and to
settle or try several thousand asbestos claims from workers exposed to
asbestos in the Brooklyn Navy Yard.172 He would also make two unsuc-
cessful efforts to save from bankruptcy two smaller companies that had
manufactured asbestos by way of class action settlements.173
“The Johns Manville Corporation, the largest manufacturer of
asbestos, overwhelmed by asbestos claims, [had] filed for bankruptcy in
1982.”174 The result of the bankruptcy was the creation of the Manville
Trust, funded by a majority of the company’s stock.175 The Trust came
to own eighty percent of the working company’s stock.176 However, the
behavior of the Trust’s first trustees proved to be profligate.177 Perhaps
as much as two-thirds of the trust’s funds were going to the plaintiffs’
166. Id. at 12; see generally In re Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.
1995); In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990).
167. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
168. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 342.
169. Id. at 345.
170. Id.
171. Judge Charles Weiner: Record Matched by Few, THIRD BRANCH (July 2003), http://
www.uscourts.gov/news/thethirdbranch/03-07-01/judge_charles_weiner_record_matched_by_
few.aspx. See also MORRIS, supra note 15, at 345–46.
172. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 344, 346–47.
173. Id. at 348.
174. Id. at 342.
175. Id. at 343.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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lawyers and to the expenses of running the trust.178 In 1990, when it
became Weinstein’s duty for the first time to attend to the running of the
Trust, he found that it had spent 900 million dollars to settle some
22,000 claims at an average of $40,000 per claimant.179 However, some
two dozen attorneys may well have received as much as 200 million
dollars for their work.180
Weinstein wielded extraordinary equitable powers when he dealt
with the Trust.181 He issued an injunction barring anyone from introduc-
ing evidence in any court case involving other asbestos defendants that
might hold the Manville Trust jointly liable or in any way responsible.182
On July 9, 1990, Weinstein, sitting jointly with New York State
Supreme Court Justice Helen Freedman, ordered the complete overhaul
of the Trust and replaced the trustees.183 Staking out broad authority
over all problems arising out of the Manville reorganization, Weinstein
appeared to have achieved a new class action settlement: this was the
first instance a major corporation’s bankruptcy plan was rewritten years
after it had been approved.184 In June 1991, Weinstein approved the
revision of the trust in a 503-page opinion.185 A year and a half later, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit completely overturned the
restructuring of the first Manville Trust.186 In 1994, a settlement was
ultimately reached.187 The reconstructed trust would become a paradigm
for compensation of asbestos victims.
The cases coming from the Brooklyn Navy Yard were handled suc-
cessfully. In these cases, Weinstein had authority as judge of both the
Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, and he again worked in
tandem with Justice Helen Freedman of the New York State Supreme




181. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 978–80 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
182. Id.; Weinstein Oral History, supra note 97 (manuscript at 1019–20). Other manufacturers
could then file a claim with the Manville Trust. The settlement was to be reviewed for fairness by
the general counsel of the AFL–CIO. See Sharon Walsh, Overhaul of Manville Fund Set;
Settlement Proposed for Asbestos Victims, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1990; Sharon Walsh, Asbestos
the Faces Behind the Case Numbers; More Than 8,000 Plaintiffs in Area Wait Out the Protracted
Legal Process, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1990, at B1.
183. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 344.
184. Id.
185. In re Joint E. & S. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710.
186. In re Joint E. & S. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
187. Edward A. Adams, Parties Reach Settlement in Manville Trust Cases, N.Y. L.J., July 28,
1994, at 1.
188. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 343–44. Some of the cases were also handled by Judges
Charles P. Sifton of the Eastern District and Robert W. Sweet of the Southern District.
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court jointly exercised federal and state power.189 The two “held hear-
ings together, issued orders together, and . . . intend[ed] to try cases
together, though ultimately that did not prove necessary.”190 By March
1992, the courts in New York City had disposed of all their asbestos
cases.191
To spare the Eagle-Picher company from bankruptcy, “Weinstein
issued a series of near path-breaking opinions on the power of the [dis-
trict] court to stay litigation in state and federal courts.”192 This decision
provided legal authority in the Manville Trust case. Weinstein also
approved a class action settlement covering 175,000 claimants, but, at
the last minute, the deal collapsed, and Eagle-Picher filed for bank-
ruptcy.193 Weinstein was also unsuccessful in attempting to use a settle-
ment class action to save the Keene Corporation. The court of appeals,
now showing its preference for disposition of such claims through bank-
ruptcy rather than class actions, vacated and dismissed the action.194
Additionally, Weinstein made three significant contributions to
class actions involving injuries caused by DES, a synthetic estrogen,
which as the years of its use wore on would be connected to uterine
deformities, ectopic pregnancies, and defects in the female children of
women who had taken the drug.195 Two of Weinstein’s decisions would
add to the pressures on the defendant companies to settle.
The first decision dealt with jurisdiction. Weinstein wrote a lengthy
opinion that clearly departed from U.S. Supreme Court doctrine. At
issue in the case was jurisdiction over an out-of-state company that had
virtually no contacts with New York.196 Weinstein, however, held that
New York could exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident manu-
facturer of DES without a showing that a manufacturer had minimum
contacts or any territorial connection with New York.197
Weinstein’s intimate familiarity with questions of jurisdiction could
be dated back to his work on the New York Civil Practice Act and
189. Id.
190. Id. Weinstein tried sixty-four Navy Yard cases, including fifty in one sitting. See Kenneth
P. Nolan, Weinstein on the Courts, 18 LITIG., no. 3, Spring 1992, at 24, 25.
191. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 347.
192. Id. at 348.
193. See id.
194. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., No. 93-cv-02129, 1993 WL 604077, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1993), vacated, 14 F.3d 726, 727 (2d Cir. 1993).
195. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 349.
196. Id.
197. In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 591 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d
Cir. 1993).
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Rules,198 or perhaps even earlier to his work as a professor of civil pro-
cedure.199 It continued to be an area to which he gave much thought.
Believing that the area of the law was “all fouled up,” he not only
wanted to modernize it, but to replace it with a politico-economic philos-
ophy.200 Weinstein’s theoretical (as well as practical) view was that the
“United States constitutes a common economic pond that knows no state
boundaries. A substantial interjection of products at any point of the
national market has ripple effects in all parts of the market.”201 Wein-
stein was attempting to create a single forum in which all the significant
players could be united.202 He must have known that such a reform
would benefit plaintiffs, but it is not clear that was a goal of his. He
certainly must have been aware that, although the court of appeals would
likely reverse, the case before him would probably settle. In that event,
Weinstein’s 103-page treatise-like opinion would be out there for use in
other mass tort cases.203 The case did settle. The opinion received praise,
and he would return to it in the light cigarette litigation.204 No one, how-
ever, rushed to adopt it, and Weinstein was later criticized for writing
the opinion, knowing that it was unreviewable by the court of appeals.205
Weinstein’s second important opinion in the DES case dealt with
the statute of limitations.206 The New York statute of limitations for per-
sonal injury would begin to run from the time that the plaintiff discov-
ered her “injury.”207 But, when would that be for the daughters of DES
mothers? Did it date “from the time they first found out that their
mothers had taken the drug twenty years before?”208 At that time, the
daughters could hardly have known that their potential infertility
problems and reproductive track abnormalities might be the result of
their mothers’ having taken DES.209 “Weinstein held that awareness of
the medical problem alone did not trigger the statute of limitations”;
rather, it was only “triggered when the daughters had a good reason to
198. See Oscar G. Chase, The CPLR at Fifty: Its Past, Present, and Future, 16 LEG. & PUB.
POL’Y 643, 647–53 (2013).
199. Morris, supra note 15, at 46.
200. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 97 (manuscript at 1128–30).
201. In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. at 576.
202. Neuborne, supra note 154, at 2097.
203. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 351.
204. Id. at 352; see infra notes 262–67 and accompanying text.
205. See Burbank, supra note 89, at 2004–05; Neuborne, supra note 154, at 2097–99.
206. Braune v. Abbott Labs., 895 F. Supp. 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). The discussion of Braune
draws from my prior work. See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 352–53.
207. Braune, 895 F. Supp. at 542 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c (McKinney 1995)); MORRIS,
supra note 15, at 352.
208. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 352.
209. Id.
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conclude that a human-made product had led to the difficulty.”210
Weinstein’s third influential contribution to the DES litigation
involved the four meetings he held in his chambers with DES plaintiffs.
He held these meetings so he could hear the stories of the DES daugh-
ters and other family members.211 These conversations left a profound
mark on the Judge and undoubtedly intensified his very strong view that
plaintiffs in mass torts actions needed to be heard and allowed “to vent,
to express their frustrations, to feel that the system really cares what
happened,”212 and that part of a judge’s role in class actions was to
expose himself or herself to the emotional and other needs of the liti-
gants. He would even title his book on class actions Individual Justice in
Mass Tort Litigation.213
Judge Weinstein was also involved in two other aggregations of
mass torts cases in the early to mid-1990s.214 He presided over the earli-
est-filed repetitive stress injury (“RSI”) cases in the district.215 These
cases dealt with plaintiffs whose injuries were “arguably caused by the
routine use of computers, super-market checkout scanners, and other
devices.”216 Weinstein chose to consolidate cases covering a number of
different ailments for which there might have been numerous causes.217
While the court of appeals dismissed appeals of Weinstein’s consolida-
tion, it did grant the writ of mandamus making Weinstein’s approach to
the RSI cases impossible to achieve.218 The one significant contribution
Weinstein made to the RSI cases was an opinion that was essentially a
small treatise on how a court should go about determining whether a
damages award is reasonable.219 This opinion would go on to become
very influential in both federal and state courts.220
In litigation involving silicone breast implants certified by Judge
Sam Pointer of the Northern District of Alabama, Weinstein and Harold
Baer, a judge from the Southern District of New York, were assigned to
210. Id.; Braune, 895 F. Supp. at 545.
211. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 352.
212. Bilello v. Abbot Labs., 825 F. Supp. 475, 480 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
213. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 135 (1995)
[hereinafter INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE]. After the hearings, Weinstein denied a motion for reversal,
writing that “[t]he fact that a judge empathizes with other human beings does not render him or
her partial.” Bilello, 825 F. Supp. at 481.
214. This discussion draws from my prior work. See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 354–62.
215. Id. at 356.
216. Id.
217. In re Repetitive Stress Injury Cases, 142 F.R.D. 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 11 F.3d
368 (2d Cir. 1993).
218. Debruyne v. Nat’l Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.3d 640, 643 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Repetitive
Stress Injury Litig., 35 F.3d 637, 640 (2d Cir. 1994).
219. Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
220. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 357.
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try the pending cases in their districts.221 The two judges coordinated
their cases with New York State Supreme Court Justice Joan B.
Lobis.222 The one significant contribution Weinstein and Baer made was
the naming of “a team of three special masters to help identify what
science the judges needed to know to [understand] the connection
between breast implants and serious health problems.”223 They also
helped select the panel of experts to advise the court.224 After Weinstein
and Baer acted, Pointer, acknowledging the use of Weinstein’s proce-
dures, employed Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (dealing
with court-appointed expert witnesses) to appoint such a panel to aid
him.225 A study by the Federal Judicial Center strongly supported the
value of Pointer’s experiment.226
In addition to his opinions, Weinstein also addressed the subject of
mass torts in a number of law review articles.227 Weinstein’s philosophy
in dealing with mass torts is paradoxical: he favors class actions as the
only meaningful way for litigants with small claims to get their day in
court. Yet, he achieves this by aggregating thousands of cases. Wein-
stein is quite aware that aggregation can be a bonanza for plaintiffs’
lawyers and that many claims that are filed as class actions are spurious.
However, he believes that the judge handling a class action can limit the
transaction costs.
While Weinstein’s judicial philosophy and actions as a judge have
demonstrated his sympathy for the “little guy,” he is also concerned with
safeguarding the economic viability of defendant corporations—not
only for their own good and for the good of their victim-creditors, but
also for their employees and shareholders. A corporate defendant’s pros-





226. See Joseph M. Price & Ellen S. Rosenberg, The Silicon Gel Breast Implant Controversy:
The Rise of Expert Panels and the Fall of Junk Science, 93 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 31, 34 (Jan.
2000). A similar effort by Judge Robert E. Jones of the District of Oregon was also applauded. See
Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Or. 1996).
227. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 GEO. L.J. 1389
(1985); Jack B. Weinstein & Jonathan B. Weiner, Of Sailing Ships and Seeking Facts: Brief
Reflections on Magistrates and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 429,
436 (1988); Jack B. Weinstein, Modern Teaching at Brooklyn Law School—The Example of Toxic
Torts, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 329 (1986); Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural and Substantive Problems in
Complex Litigation Arising from Disasters, 5 TOURO L. REV. 1 (1988); Jack B. Weinstein &
Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269 (1991);
Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law’s Reaction to Disasters, 11 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (1986); Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 145. See also Scott Fruehwald, Individual
Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: Judge Jack B. Weinstein on Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases, 31
HOFSTRA L. REV. 323 (2002).
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perity, he firmly believes, may be a significant community asset.228
Weinstein’s book on mass torts is largely about ethical issues and
emphasizes the need for ethical behavior by judges, parties, lawyers,
legislators, and others.229 His broad sense of ethics “orbits steadfastly
around a moral sun: individual dignity and moral worth.”230 In creating
what have been called temporary administrative agencies made for the
situation, he focuses on a critical question: “how can we use our system
so we do not lose that sense of the dignity of the individual without
losing efficiency?”231 In class actions, the judge must be the central
player. “We need,” he has said, “to rethink the obligation of the judge to
our society in mass torts . . . .”232 As he told a room of judges, lawyers,
and professors at the symposium honoring him on his eightieth birthday:
No matter how routine or how massive or complex the case, justice is
ultimately measured by how it affects the lives of real individuals as
well as institutions. If the law cannot make lives better—or at least
prevent unnecessary harm—then it has failed . . . .233
The increasing skepticism of the use of class actions for mass torts
by judges of the courts of appeals was strengthened by the first two U.S.
Supreme Court decisions to deal with this area of the law. In Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor,234 an asbestos class action, the Supreme
Court agreed with a Third Circuit decision that had overturned a settle-
ment.235 A major concern in this litigation was a separate settlement
approved by an overly passive judge. The Supreme Court rejected that
settlement on the grounds that the settlement class was too disparate to
certify for class purposes.236
Two years later, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,237 the Supreme
Court rejected a mandatory limited fund settlement of nationwide asbes-
tos claims because it impaired the due process rights of class members
and absent future claimants.238 In both Amchem and Ortiz, the Court
telegraphed in dicta its distaste for the innovative experiments federal
judges had been using to resolve mass tort cases through the class action
rule and suggested that judicial authority under the Rules Enabling Act
228. See Luban, supra note 146, at 2073–74.
229. See generally INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 213.
230. Luban, supra note 146, at 2070.
231. 80th Birthday Roundtable, supra note 28, at 172.
232. INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 213, at 9.
233. Steven M. Gold & Peter G. Eikenberry, Focus On: Judge Weinstein, 8 FED. B. COUNCIL
NEWS, Dec. 2001, at 1, 4.
234. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
235. Id. at 597, aff’g Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
236. Luban, supra note 146, at 2080; see also Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 623–25.
237. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
238. Id. at 846, 864–65.
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had been transcended.239
In the meantime, Judge Weinstein was occupied for about a decade
(between 1996 and 2006) with class actions dealing with the two politi-
cally volatile industries of guns and cigarettes.240 Neither ended with
global resolution, and each was marked by a considerable number of
reversals by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; yet, Wein-
stein’s opinions and several of his law review articles contributed signif-
icantly to the literature on class actions.241
Beginning in 1995, Weinstein presided over a series of cases aimed
at limiting the flow of illegal guns into New York City.242 One line of
cases involved private suits for damages brought by plaintiffs whose
family members had been killed with guns.243 In this line of cases, it was
alleged that the guns had reached New York as the result of negligence
either by manufacturers in their distribution or by later sellers.244 The
other line of cases was based upon a theory of nuisance.245
In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, Weinstein held that there had been indus-
try-wide activity posing a substantial risk of personal injury.246 In an
opinion similar to that of the DES cases, he held that there was jurisdic-
tion over the gun manufacturers and distributors even though some had
not done business in New York or maintained an office there.247 He then
upheld a special jury verdict that the manufacturers had “over-supplied
[stores in] states with weak gun laws, leading to illegal sales in states
with stricter gun laws.”248 However, when it answered certified ques-
tions sent to it by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the New
York State Court of Appeals refused to hold the gun industry liable
under New York law.249 While Weinstein was willing to extend market
239. Id.; see also Mullenix, supra note 118, at 20.
240. See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 358–64.
241. See generally The Future of Class Actions in Mass Tort Cases: A Roundtable Discussion,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1657 (1998). See also Jack B. Weinstein, Science, and the Challenges of
Expert Testimony in the Courtroom, 77 OR. L. REV. 1005 (1998); Jack B. Weinstein, Mass Tort
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in a Multinational World Communicating by Extraterrestrial
Satellites, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 145 (2001); Jack B. Weinstein, Compensating Large Numbers
of People for Inflicted Harms, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 165 (2001); Jack B. Weinstein &
Catherine Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2001); Compensation
for Mass Private Delicts, supra note 99.





246. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 838 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
247. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 32 F. Supp. 2d 47 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); see also Morris, supra note
15, at 359.
248. Morris, supra note 15, at 359; see also 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
249. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1068 (N.Y. 2001).
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share liability beyond the DES case, the state court would not go so far.
As a result, the Second Circuit vacated Weinstein’s judgment.250
The gun cases that were based on a theory of nuisance were
brought by the NAACP and New York City. In the NAACP litigation,
Weinstein relied on the public safety rationale for public nuisance, hold-
ing that “an interference with a public right occurs when the health,
safety or comfort of a considerable number of persons in New York is
endangered or injured, or the use by the public of a public place is
hindered.”251
The NAACP case was tried over a period of six weeks.252 Wein-
stein used an advisory jury to determine whether there was a “nuisance”
and to advise on the nature of a potential injunction.253 He would, how-
ever, dismiss the case because the NAACP was unable to demonstrate
that it suffered harm different in kind from that suffered by the public at
large, which was a requisite of the law.254
While the NAACP case had been thrown out, the City of New York
was a proper representative that could assert the harm suffered by the
public at large. In this litigation, Weinstein rendered a number of impor-
tant opinions finding “jurisdiction over small, out-of-state gun shops.”255
As a result of the litigation, twenty of twenty-seven defendant gun shops
settled with the city, “agreeing to allow their sales practices to be moni-
tored and to attend training sessions on how to avoid practices that could
lead to the sale of guns in New York.”256
In the gun cases, in addition to his opinions on jurisdiction, market
share, and nuisance, Weinstein engaged in a remarkable duel with Con-
gress over the use of data collected by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives.257 The data was needed as evidence.258 Pres-
sured by the gun lobby, Congress passed four different laws attempting
to prevent the bureau from disclosing the evidence for use in gun litiga-
tion.259  Weinstein’s case was a major target. Three times Weinstein
250. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Rabin, supra note
133, at 15–16.
251. NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Johnson v.
Bryco Arms, 304 F. Supp. 2d 383 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
252. Morris, supra note 15, at 360.
253. Id.
254. NAACP v. Acusport, 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
255. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 361; City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 501 F.
Supp. 2d 369, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
256. Morris, supra note 15, at 361. See also Alan Feuer, U.S. Appeals Court Rejects City’s Suit
to Curb Guns, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2008, at B2.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 118 Stat. 3 (2004);
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 118 Stat. 2809, 2859 (2004); Protection
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found ways to evade complying with the legislation, while avoiding a
constitutional confrontation.260 Finally, the Second Circuit put an end to
the struggle and to the litigation by holding that a legislative bar to liti-
gation was constitutional and applicable to Weinstein’s gun case.261
Weinstein was no more successful in achieving a global resolution
in the various class actions he presided over involving light cigarettes.262
In those suits, the plaintiffs’ general theory was that, when the cigarette
companies marketed light cigarettes, they had engaged in misrepresenta-
tions leading consumers to believe that the light cigarettes were less of a
health hazard than regular cigarettes.263 The cases raised difficult juris-
dictional and choice of law questions, and Weinstein put an immense
effort into the litigation.264
The first time that Big Tobacco was successfully sued by a third
party—when HMOs and asbestos trusts sued for what they had spent on
the health care of those they had covered—was before Weinstein in the
light cigarette case.265 In a forty-four day trial in 2001, the jury actually
ruled against the tobacco companies, but rendered a verdict with only
miniscule damages.266 The Second Circuit and New York Court of
Appeals then made it impossible for the plaintiffs to collect what they
had won.267
The Simon I case was a traditional class action brought by lung
of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, § 119 Stat. 2095 (2005); Science, State,
Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-108, § 119 Stat.
2290, 2296 (2005).
260. See Johnson v. Bryco Arms, 222 F.R.D. 48, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); City of New York v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
228 F.R.D. 147, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d
244, 271, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 429 F. Supp. 2d 517,
520 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008), and cert. denied,
556 U.S. 1104 (2009).
261. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 404 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
556 U.S. 1104 (2009).
262. The discussion of the light cigarette cases draws from my prior work. See MORRIS, supra
note 15, at 362–64.
263. Id. at 362.
264. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 198, 206–07
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (listing over 40 opinions that Judge Weinstein had already issued on related
cases).
265. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 362.
266. Id.
267. Id.; see also Christopher Francescani, Big Tobacco to Cough Up $17M in Health-Care
Suit, N.Y. POST, June 5, 2001, at 22, available at http://nypost.com/2001/06/05/big-tobacco-to-
cough-up-17m-in-health-care-suit/ (noting that, earlier that year, a hung jury forced a mistrial in a
similar case brought by a trust set up to pay out health-care costs to sick asbestos workers who
were past smokers).
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cancer victims seeking compensation.268 After Weinstein suggested in
court that the case be restructured and broadened, the Simon II suit was
filed, asking for a once-and-for-all class action determination.269 In
2002, Weinstein granted class certification to a nationwide mandatory
class of millions of smokers who alleged that they had been injured by
smoking light cigarettes and would share a single pot of punitive dam-
ages.270 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
punitive damages could not be tried without trying the underlying dam-
ages.271 That ended Simon II—the plaintiffs’ attorneys believed that it
would be too hard to prove medical causation liability and, afterwards,
punitive damages.272 The plaintiffs’ lawyers threw in the towel.273
One last light cigarette action came before Weinstein in 2006. In
Schwab v. Philip Morris,274 Weinstein certified a class action under the
Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) involving
tens of millions of plaintiffs.275 In an extraordinary 540-page typed opin-
ion accompanied by a 986-page appendix, Weinstein dealt with certifi-
cation, fraud, RICO conspiracy, expert evidence, and other issues.276 In
the appendix, Weinstein wrote a long treatise on the history of the ciga-
rette cases.277 Years later, the court of appeals reversed.278
In the light cigarette litigations, Weinstein attempted to include as
many parties as possible “in order to ensure all issues were raised, all
interested parties were consulted and all who were harmed compen-
sated.” Weinstein embraced the notion that punitive damages would be
awarded “as punishment on behalf of the entire society.” He has been a
pioneer innovator of the “punitive damages only class,” which is pre-
mised on the theory that there is an inherent public interest in punitive
damages that is distinct from the individual interest in compensatory
damages. So far, he has been successful.279
Jack Weinstein’s most recent (and, to date, most successful) inno-
268. Simon v. Phillip Morris, Inc. (Simon I), 200 F.D.R. 21 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); see also MORRIS,
supra note 15, at 363.
269. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
270. Id. at 99–100.
271. In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2005).
272. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 363.
273. Id.
274. 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
275. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 363.
276. Id.
277. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1278–2357 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
278. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 2008).
279. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The BP Oil Spill Settlement: Judge Weinstein’s Legacy, 64
DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1–3) (on file with the DePaul Law Review).
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vation is that of the “quasi-class action.”280 In litigation involving the
drug Zyprexa, Judge Weinstein created a new way of achieving mass
settlements in which mass aggregations are settled all together, although
they cannot be certified as such.281 Frustrated by judicial constraints in
the class action arena, but still believing in the need to resort to innova-
tive techniques for resolving mass claims, Weinstein created this
approach that effectively circumvents the class action rule. In such liti-
gations, the Multidistrict Litigation Panel transfers all related cases in
the nation to one federal court so that discovery can be conducted.
Weinstein’s approach, naturally, provides for judicial oversight over
such matters as client consent, attorneys’ fees, and aims for settlement.
Employing this new approach, it was possible in Zyprexa to assem-
ble one national archive for use in federal and state cases through elec-
tronic technology. Weinstein was able to help limit fees, set up a matrix
for settlement utilizing four special masters, supervise discovery using a
single special master, and settle national claims for Medicaid and Medi-
care liens in state and federal courts.282 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has backed Weinstein throughout the Zyprexa litigation.
Where class actions are concerned, the battle between litigant
autonomy versus collective redress has continued to flare. Supreme
Court decisions have generally strongly sided with the rule that a litigant
is not bound by a judgment of which he or she is not a party. The
Supreme Court’s view has been that plaintiffs are autonomous individu-
als free to seek or abandon a remedy tailored for them even if the protec-
tion of these very individuals will ultimately make impossible
vindication of their claims.283
As one would anticipate, Judge Weinstein feels and acts differently.
280. The discussion of the Zyprexa litigation draws from my prior work. See MORRIS, supra
note 15, at 364–67.
281. Id. at 364–66.
282. In re Zyprexa Prod. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 269–70 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re
Zyprexa Prod. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 496–97 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Zyprexa Prod.
Liab. Litig. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); McMillan v. City of New
York, Nos. 08-cv-2887, 03-cv-6049, 2010 WL 1487738, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2010); In re
Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. La. 2010) (limiting fees). See MORRIS, supra
note 15, at 164–67; Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the
People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 174–75 (2008);
Alexandra D. Lahav, Participation and Procedure, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
(manuscript at 21–25) (on file with the DePaul Law Review); Mullenix, supra note 118, at 19, 22.
See also AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (Discussion Draft
2006).
283. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559
U.S. 393 (2010). See also David Marcus, Two Models of the Civil Litigant, 64 DEPAUL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author).
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For him, litigants are not isolated individuals but members of a commu-
nity that defines them and to whom they have obligations. Weinstein
attempts to balance human dignity against the efficacy of civil justice in
an age of aggregation.284 Repeatedly, he has “tried to recognize the
value of individual voices in litigation, while doing so within a proce-
dural framework that makes successful aggregate adjudication of claims
on their merits possible.”285
V. CONCLUSION
Judge Jack Weinstein has been the most significant figure in the
area of mass torts for more than thirty years. His contributions have
included hundreds of opinions and other judicial works, one book, a
number of law review articles, speeches, law school teaching, as well as
his influence upon a distinguished number of law professors. Among the
aspects of mass torts in which he has left an important mark are case
management, jurisdiction, choice of law, the use of special masters and
magistrates, fairness hearings, the measure of damages, future claimants,
the use of advisory juries, expert witnesses and statistics, attorneys’ fees,
the use of the powers of equity, ethics, the administration of settlements,
industry-wide liability, cooperation and coordination with state judges,
and quasi-class actions.
More than three decades after the assignment of Agent Orange to
Weinstein’s docket, his philosophy of mass tort class actions is not the
prevailing position. Nevertheless, his body of work has had and contin-
ues to have an enormous impact. Professor Burt Neuborne, who acted as
lead counsel in the Holocaust litigation against Swiss Banks286 (which
was not handled by Jack Weinstein), has stated: “Every time I did any
research . . . the parameters of both the law and the problems were set in
Judge Weinstein’s remarkable corpus of work.”287 What Weinstein does,
Neuborne states, is to “build[ ] stages on which people can’t escape from
his courtroom, so that they have to discuss resolutions.”288
Kenneth Feinberg, the most prominent figure connected with vic-
tim compensation funds, including, for example, the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund, has said, “I think Judge Weinstein has
made more of an impact on American law than any judge alive.”289
Mass tort injuries are unlikely to disappear in the future. Unless
284. Marcus, supra note 283 (manuscript at 2–3).
285. Id. at 23.
286. In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2005).
287. 80th Birthday Roundtable, supra note 28, at 184.
288. Id. at 186.
289. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 2.
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Congress chooses to place the problem of compensation for such disas-
ters with administrative agencies, great aggregations of cases impossible
to tackle on an individual basis will continue to arise. It seems likely
then that these society-wide issues will have to be dealt with by the
courts. If and when that happens, judges will have as a resource the
work of the still very active ninety-three year old Judge Weinstein.290
What then have been the factors that led Judge Jack B. Weinstein to
become a judicial entrepreneur? First, there are his personal abilities—
his brilliance and exceptional knowledge of procedure and evidence,
which leads the Multidistrict Litigation Panel to send cases to him.291
Along with this is his ability to see cases as a whole, perceive connec-
tions between fields of law others do not see, and an ability to recast
mundane issues brought to him by lawyers into important issues. There
is also his ability to attract attention far beyond his district for his ideas,
decisions, and activities; his nationwide “constituency.” There is also his
still inhuman energy, which makes it possible for him to handle such
cases, publish articles, give speeches, and even attend symposia, while
keeping up with the rest of his docket. There is also his self-confidence,
in part innate, but also coming from his mastery of so many fields of
law. And then there is his view of the role of judges as shapers of the
law. Finally, he continues to see class actions and other aggregations of
cases as a place where the legal system can hear and protect the “little
guy”—another way to give the law a “human face.”
Timing too has been important in Jack Weinstein’s entrepreneur-
ship. Agent Orange came to him at a formative time when federal judges
were just becoming aware of the potential class actions might have for
dealing with mass torts. In addition, at the time of the Agent Orange
litigation, the nation was in the midst of retreating from grand solutions
coming through the legislative and executive branches. The federal gov-
ernment was being “downsized.” This left a vacuum for the judicial
branch to fill and, at the time, there were many judges appointed by
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson at the height of their careers who were
liberal and activist. Weinstein provided an important model of what
could be done in mass torts, a model that would be attractive to many on
the bench.
Finally, from Weinstein’s perspective, there were no real risks. He
was a strikingly independent judge. Reversal by the court of appeals
never troubled him (and apparently never will). If he had greater ambi-
290. Helen E. Freedman & Kenneth R. Feinberg, Managing Mass Torts, 80 JUDICATURE 44
(1996) (reviewing JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION (1995)).
291. He may also have been the beneficiary of some forum-shopping by plaintiffs’ attorneys.
See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 368.
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tions in the years prior to Agent Orange (and there is little to suggest
that he did), he would have seen them frustrated by being passed over
for appointment both to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit and to the New York State Court of Appeals.292 Finally, his reputa-
tion as an important scholar might not protect him from criticism but
would protect him from being viewed as some “off-the-wall crack pot.”
Already seriously interested in class actions before the Agent
Orange case came to him, its uniqueness (for its time) forced Weinstein
to write many opinions. Being Weinstein, the opinions were long, thor-
ough, and all published. Thus, it was not just the size of the case or the
fact that he was able to settle it that gained his work such wide attention
in the legal community. It was also his body of opinions.
Weinstein would never again be as successful with the court of
appeals as he was in Agent Orange. He was fortunate to have handled
the first mass torts class action to reach the Second Circuit, which had
not yet developed its skepticism of class actions.
But, if Agent Orange was the high point of Weinstein’s success
with the Second Circuit, the shadow he left over the field would not
disappear. Other class actions came to him—in part because of the
respect of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel—and he continued to be
interested in virtually every aspect of those litigations. And he continued
to write and to speak. As his academic colleagues of his earlier career
age retired or died, Weinstein proved able to excite younger scholars
who carried on the fight from the law schools.
In their book, McIntosh and Cates indicated how unusual it is to
find judicial entrepreneurs.293 They presented four—two from the U.S.
Supreme Court, one from a court of appeals, and a state supreme court
judge. They did not even suggest that it was a possibility for a trial
judge. They should have considered Judge Jack B. Weinstein.
292. A few years after Judge Weinstein was defeated in the primary election for nomination as
Chief Judge to the New York Court of Appeals, the position became appointive.
293. MCINTOSH & CATES, supra note 19.
